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Sociological interest in the effect of status characteristics 
on the behavior of individuals, particularly in face-to-face inter-
action, may be traced to the work of Simmel and of Park early in this 
century. First Simmel and then Park presented theoretical arguments 
suggesting that individuals perceive each other in terms of status 
categories, and that individuals then organize their behavior toward 
each other in accord with these perceptions."1" More recently, a rather 
large number of empirical studies has demonstrated the usefulness of 
these notions. In general, this literature has demonstrated that, 
when a task-oriented group is differentiated with respect to some 
external status characteristic, this status difference determines the 
distribution of power and prestige within the group, whether or not 
the status characteristic is directly related to the group task. 
(See, for example, Caudill, 1958: Chapter 10; Torrance, 1954; 
Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins, 1958; Strodtbeck and Mann, 1956; 
Katz, Goldston and Benjamin, 1958; Katz and Benjamin, 1960.) 
Through a coordinated program of research and theory (Berger, 
Cohen and Zelditch, 1966; Berger, Conner and Fisek, 1974), a detailed 
explanation of these findings has been developed, consistent with 
Simmel's and Park's ideas; this explanation relates the status charac-
teristics an individual is perceived to possess to stabilized concep-
tions of his performance capacities (called expectation states) he 
and others develop for his behavior on the basis of such 
characteristics. 
The expectation states theoretical research program has devel-
oped along a number of different "paths" or "branches," two of which 
are of relevance here. First, a body of theory and related empirical 
evidence has attempted to account for the emergence and effects of 
performance expectation states on behavior in interpersonal 
2 
situations. For the present study, the most important derivation 
from the theoretical work is that differential expectation states 
within a group determine the distribution of power and prestige in 
the group. The related research uses a standardized experimental 
setting, originally developed by Berger (see Berger and Snell, 1961); 
results of these studies, expressly constructed to test the theory, 
support the derivation stated above (see particularly Berger and 
Conner, 1969). 
A second branch of development in the program is concerned 
with the effects of status characteristics on expectation states 
and the circumstances under which these effects occur. The first 
theoretical formulation in this branch of the program (Berger, Cohen 
and Zelditcn, 1966) was designed primarily to account for the 
research results outlined at the beginning of this report. It argues 
that, if members of a task group are differentiated with respect to a 3 
diffuse status characteristic, this differentiation provides the 
basis for the formation of performance expectations by members of the 
group. Using the derivation mentioned above, the formulation also 
argues that diffuse status characteristics, through their relation to 
performance expectations, determine the power and prestige structure 
in a group. Research on the 1966 formulation has included evidence 
for the principle derivations of the theory, both from direct experi-
mental tests (e.g., Moore, 1968, 1969; Berger, Cohen and Zelditch, 
1972; Zeller and Warnecke, 197 3) and from open interaction studies 
(e.g., Cohen, 1971, 1972; Cohen and Roper, 1972; Lohman, 1971; 
Lockheed and Hall, 1975). Other research has focused on extensions 
and refinements of the original formulation. Seashore (1968) and 
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Cohen, Kiker and Kruse (1369) studied the effects of equating or 
conflicting statuses. In addition, multiple characteristic status 
situations have been investigated by Berger and Fisek (1970), Berger, 
Fisek and Crosbie (1970), Tress (1971) and Kervin (1972). Finally, 
Berger, Fisek and Freese (1970) and Freese (1970) evaluated the 
effects of another kind of status element, the specific status char-
& 
acteristic, " on the determination of power and prestige structures. 
Berger and Fisek (1974) present a generalization of the theory 
of status characteristics and expectation states. Its objectives are 
twofold: first, it extends the scope (i.e., increases the generality) 
of the theory to (1) describe the operation of both specific and dif-
fuse characteristics on performance expectations via similar pro-
cesses, and (2) describe the simultaneous operation of multiple char-
acteristics, whether specific or diffuse; second, the formulation 
increases the explanatory power of the theory by accounting for each 
of the extensions and refinements of the earlier formulation as part 
of the theory itself, and by providing a structure from which new con-
sequences can be derived. 
The generalization is formulated from the point of view of an 
actor, p, in a small, informal, task-oriented group, who is oriented 
to two or more "social objects" in the group: himself, p', and at 
least one other actor, o. In this sense, the theory is p-centric. 
The task, T, on which the group is working is assumed to have the 
following characteristics: (1) T must have at least two differentially 
evaluated outcome states, one of which is defined as "success" and the 
other as "failure" at the task; (2) p must believe that there is at 
least one characteristic which is directly relevant to successful 
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completion of T (i.e., success is not a matter of chance); (3) T is 
unitary; and (4) T is collective (i.e., it is both necessary and 
legitimate for actors to take the behavior of one another into account 
in completing the task). For example, diagnosing a patient's illness 
may be considered an appropriate task if (1) it is believed that there 
is a correct and an incorrect diagnosis (i.e., one can distinguish 
between success and failure at the task), (2) p believes that "diag-
nostic skill" is involved in solving the problem the task presents, 
(3) no other type of task is immediately involved in the situation, 
and (4) the joint efforts of two or more doctors are both legitimate 
and required to arrive at an appropriate diagnosis. 
The social objects in the group are described in terms of the 
characteristics each possesses, or is expected to possess. A charac-
teristic is some property of an individual which might be used to 
describe him. A characteristic is a status characteristic if it con-
sists of at least two states which are differentially evaluated in 
terms of honor, esteem, or desirability. Further, status characteris-
tics may be either specific or diffuse (as defined in footnotes 3 and 
4 above). The theory is assumed to apply in situations where (1) p' 
and o possess any number or kind of status characteristic, (2) at 
least one of these characteristics is connected to the task and/or 
discriminates between p' and o, and (3) possession of status charac-
teristics is the only information members of the group initially have 
about one another. For example, the theory may apply in a situation 
involving a 25-year-old man and a 25-year-old woman. In this case, at 
least two status characteristics, age and sex, are present if either 
one evaluates adulthood more highly than youth (for example), and 
maleness more highly than femaleness (for example). Note, however, 
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that only sex discriminates between the two. If all these two people 
initially know about each other is their ages and their sexes, the 
situation meets the status requirements of the theory. 
* Any situation satisfying these conditions is designated S . * 
That is, S is any situation in which there is an evaluated, unitary, 
collective task T to which p is oriented, and in which there are two 
or more social objects, p' and o, who possess any number of status 
characteristics, either specific or diffuse, at least one of which 
either discriminates between p' and o or is connected to the task 
directly. Thus, if we assume that our 25-year-old man and 25-year-old 
woman are interns and put them to work diagnosing a patient's illness, 
* 
as described above, the situation satisfies all the conditions of S . 
The states of status characteristics and of task outcomes are 
termed "elements" or "status elements," and are designated by e^ e^, 
or ek- Social objects, p' and o, are designated by y or z. 
Several types of relations, or bonds, may occur among the social 
objects and status elements in the situation. First is the relation 
of possession (or expected possession), which always involves a social 
object as transmitter and a status element as receiver of the relation; 
the possession relation is asymmetric: social objects may possess 
status elements but not vice versa. Second, the relation of similarity 
applies only between elements; similarity is symmetric: if element 
e^ is similar to element e^, then e^ is similar to e^. Third, the 
relevance relation involves each actor's "possession expectancies" foj * 
any two elements in S ; that is, an element e^ is relevant to element 
e^ if and only if, when y possesses e^, y expects or is expected to 
possess e.. Relevance is neither symmetric nor transitive; however, 
under certain special conditions (outlined below), actors in S are 
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assumed to behave as if^  the relation were both symmetric and 
transitive. Finally, direct task relevance is a special case of the 
relevance relation in which element e. is an outcome state of the 
— ••••-
task. 
Using these entities and relations, the central definitions 
and assumptions of the theory account for the following processes: 
1) How, and under what conditions, status elements possessed 
* 
by group members come into play (i.e., become salient) in S . In 
general, if p' and o possess status characteristics that either are 
directly task relevant or, if not task relevant, discriminate between 
them, then these characteristics will become salient. Note that a 
discriminating characteristic does not become salient if and only if 
the characteristic is specifically dissociated from T (i.e., is 
already believed to be independent of T). To illustrate, let us 
return to our illness diagnosis example. Assume that the man and 
woman believe that males have more diagnostic skill than females. 
Or assume that neither the man nor the woman have any prior beliefs 
as to how sex differences are related to differences in diagnostic 
skill. In either case, sex is activated as a status characteristic; 
ic 
technically, sex has become salient in S . Note that only if the 
status characteristic of sex is activated does the theory predict 
behavior correlated with "sex differences" (e.g., men engaging in more 
task-related behaviors than women). If sex is not activated, there 
are no grounds for predicting that those behavioral differences which 
are a function of sex as a status characteristic should appear 
(cf. Lockheed and Hall, 1975). 
2) Given salience, how and under what conditions status ele-
ments possessed by group members become organized so as to define the 
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situation for them. Two separate processes are assumed to operate here. 
First, if there is a path of task relevance (defined in the next sec-* 
tion) in S , then status elements originally only indirectly relevant tc 
T will, via a spread of relevance, become directly relevant to the task. 
Second, if there is no path of task relevance, then salient status ele-
ments that are originally non-related will become relevant to the task. 
In other words, actors act as if the burden of proof is on showing that 
status elements are not relevant to the task, rather than the other way 
around. Returning to our example, if p perceives sex as relevant to 
some other characteristic, say creativity, which in turn he perceives 
as relevant to diagnostic skill, the spread of relevance process argues 
that p will come to believe sex is directly relevant to diagnostic 
skill. Further, even if p does not perceive any relevance between sex 
and diagnostic skill (i.e., there is no path of task relevance), sex 
will become relevant to diagnostic skill, unless p explicitly believes 
that sex is completely independent of diagnostic skill. Note that, as 
long as sex is perceived as a salient status characteristic as described 
above, by virtue of the burden of proof process, both the male and the 
female group members begin with an expectation of male's superiority to 
female in a new task situation; that is, status superiors start with an 
"expectation advantage" in new task situations. 
3) Given the organization of elements, through either the 
spread of relevance or burden of proof processes, how this organization 
determines the behavior of members of the group, particularly those 
behaviors comprising the observable power and prestige order (OPPO) of 
the group. In general, p is assumed to form "aggregated expectation 
states" for himself and o, such that the greater the combined relevance 
of positively evaluated status elements, possessed by an actor, that 
are directly relevant to the task, the higher will be the performance 
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expectations for that actor. Given that p has formed these aggregated 
expectation states, p's power and prestige position relative to o will 
be a direct function of p's expectation advantage over o (i.e., the 
value of p's aggregated expectation state minus the value of o's). 
More simply, the behavior of a status superior (defined in terms of 
expectation advantage), relative to that of a status inferior, -
involves more task-related behavior (performance outputs), less reac-
tive behavior (granting of action opportunities, communication of 
evaluations), and more exercised influence. The situation is, of 
course, just the opposite for the status inferior (i.e., less task-
related behavior, more reactive behavior, and greater likelihood of 
being influenced rather than exercising influence). In our example 
above, therefore, we can assume that the male group member will, among 
other things, exercise more influence over the decisions of the group 
than will the female group member.^ 
To summarize, the 1974 generalization posits a status organiz-
ing process. It describes the various constituents (i.e., elements) 
which may become organized, suggests the sufficient conditions under 
which these elements become activated (i.e., available for processing), 
specifies the processes by which these elements operate in defining 
the status situation, accounts for the generation of behavioral expec-
tations on the basis of the definition of the situation, and finally 
details the behavioral consequences of these expectations. More gen-
erally, the theory provides answers to the following questions: 
1) What are the elements which a person may use in defining a sit-
uation in terms of status? 
2) How do these status elements become organized so as to define 
a situation? 
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3) What are the behavioral consequences of the definition of a 
situation in terms of status? 
A much more complete and formal description of the generaliza-
tion may be found in Berger, Conner and Fisek (1974: 173-195). 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Berger and Fisek (1974: 195-202) report the results of two sets 
of experiments, designed to provide information and evidence relevant 
to the assumptions of the generalization. The first set of experi-
ments (Berger and Fisek, 1970; Berger, Fisek and Crosbie, 1970) deals 
with the formation of expectation states in multiple status character-
istic situations. The second set (Berger, Fisek and Freese, 1970) con 
cerns the operation of the relevance process, and, in particular, the 
validity of the spread of relevance assumption. The results of that 
study indicate that relevance does, indeed, spread so that status ele-
ments which are originally indirectly relevant become directly relevanl 
* 
to the task. In other words, as noted above, actors in situation S 
act as if the relevance relation were symmetric and transitive. 
The study reported here is concerned with a further exploration 
of the relevance process. The earlier study was concerned with the 
operation of relevance under conditions in which the indirectly rele-
vant elements were similar in evaluation to each other and to the task 
elements; we now consider the operation of the relevance process unde: 
conditions in which the task elements are not all similar in evalua-
tion to each other or to the directly relevant elements. First, will 
the spread of relevance process continue to operate? Second, if it 
does, will it operate in the same way or to the same degree? Third, 
if it does not operate in the same way or to the same degree, how does 
it operate? - 9 -
The nature of the problem to be investigated may be clarified, 
using the appropriate definitions and assumptions from the generaliza-
tion. First, the relevance relation is defined as presented above: 
DEFINITION (Relevance) Element e^ is relevant to element e^ if and 
only if, when y possesses e^, y expects or is expected to possess ej. 
As noted above, the relevance relation itself is logically neither sym-
metric nor transitive. 
We may then define a "path of task relevance," a concept 
designed to capture the notion of indirect relational linkages between 
* elements possessed by p' and o and task outcomes in S : 
DEFINITION (Path of Task Relevance) A path of task relevance from ei 
to e^ is a collection of distinct elements e^, &2> e3' •••» en (n ^ 3) 
together with n-1 relations, such that 
1) a similarity or relevance relation holds between each pair 
e,e~ or e~e, , e 0e 0 or e 0e 0, ..., e ,e„ or e„e_ ,, with at least 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 n-1 n n n-1 
one of the relations being that of relevance; 
* 
2) the element e^ is possessed by y, and is salient in S , and the 
element en represents an outcome state of the task T. 
A few things should be noted with regard to this definition. 
First, in the case where a path consists of two elements linked by a 
relevance bond, the path of task relevance and the direct task rele-
vance bond are identical. Second, Condition 1 of the definition 
requires that, in a path of task relevance, the effect of a relevance 
relation be independent of its direction; a path from e1 to en is iden-
tical to one from e to e,. Finally, although the definition does not 
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require it, for the sake of simplicity of exposition it is assumed 
that, if there is a path from p' to the task, there is a corresponding 
path from o to the task. 
The assumption of the spread of task relevance argues that, 
* 
given a path of task relevance in S , a new relevance bond will be 
induced in the situation directly linking e-j^  and en> Further, the num-
ber of paths inducing the same direct task relevance bond directly 
affects the "strength" of the induced bond, or its "probability of 
being established.11 More formally: 
ASSUMPTION (Spread of Task Relevance) Given a path of task relevance * 
in S , relevance will spread such that the initial element of the path 
e1 possessed by p' and o will become directly relevant to e R, where en 
represents an outcome state of the group's task T. The greater the 
number of paths of a fixed type inducing a specific direct task rele-
vance relation, the greater the degree of the induced relation. 
Note that the assumption does not restrict the operation of the 
spread of relevance process to the induction of consistent task rele-
vance bonds (i.e., to bonds in which the possessed status element and 
the task outcome are of the same evaluation sign). In fact, Berger am 
Fisek (1974: 185) suggest that the "Spread of Task Relevance process 
may give rise to 'consistent' as well as 'inconsistent' bonds in the 
status situation." However, as stated, the assumption leaves open the 
issue of whether the strength or probability of induction of the estal 
lished bond will be the same when the status elements linked by the 
process are inconsistent (i.e., dissimilar) in evaluation. 
We may now restate more succinctly the issues to be considered 
in this study. Assume initially the existence of paths of task 
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relevance from p' and o to differentiated elements of the task. Earlier 
research indicates that, when elements along a path are consistent 
(i.e., similar) in evaluation, a direct task relevance bond is induced, 
connecting the possessed status element with a similarly evaluated or 
consistent task outcome. This study, to begin with, investigates 
whether a direct task relevance bond is induced when the elements on 
7 
the path are inconsistent and the bond to be induced is inconsistent. 
Second, given that a direct task relevance bond is induced between 
inconsistently evaluated elements, we consider whether the strength (or 
probability of induction) of that bond is the same as the strength (or 
probability of induction) of the bond induced between consistently eval-
uated elements. Third, if the induced bonds are not identical in 
strength, we may explore their differences; for example, are induced 
relevance bonds stronger when they connect consistently evaluated ele-
ments than when they connect inconsistently evaluated elements? 
The simplest consistent and inconsistent situations may be repre-
sented graphically as shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. In these 
* 
figures, C^ represents specific status characteristic i, C represents 
the directly task relevant characteristic, T represents the group task, 
p' and o are the social objects of p's orientation, and the parenthe-
sized valuation signs indicate the evaluation of particular status 
states or task elements. The relation of possession is represented by 
the placement of a particular evaluated state of characteristic C^ 
(i.e., a status element) next to its holder, p' or o; relevance is 
represented by a line connecting an element with each other element to 
which it is directly relevant. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure la shows the consistent situation before the operation of 
the spread of relevance process; Figure lb shows the changes that are 
made in the relevance structure as a result of the operation of the 
process. Figure 2a shows the inconsistent situation as it initially 
appears; if we assume that the same relevance process operates in both 
the consistent and inconsistent situations, then Figure 2b shows the 
inconsistent situation as it would appear after the spread of relevance. 
In this study, we first must evaluate whether the spread of rele-
vance process operates in inconsistent situations (i.e., whether situ-
ation 2a will come to look like situation 2b). Since we believe that 
actors will use whatever information is available to them in situations 
regardless of its relation to other information they have, we obviously 
predict that the process will operate in inconsistent situations. 
Given the operation of the process, we then must evaluate 
whether the process operates in the same way, or to the same degree, in 
both consistent and inconsistent situations. As noted above, the theory 
assumes nothing about the effect of inconsistency on this process. One 
obvious possibility is that inconsistency has no effect on the opera-
tion of the process, in which case the spread of relevance assumption 
is satisfactory as it stands, and we may have increased confidence in 
its generality. However, since the theory takes no stand on this issue 
it is also obviously possible that inconsistency of paths does affect 
the strength of the induced bond. There are at least two different 
ways in which inconsistency might have an effect. First, induced bonds, 
that are inconsistent may be weaker than induced bonds that are consis-
tent. Second, induced bonds that are inconsistent may be stronger than 
induced bonds that are consistent. 
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Although substantive explanations can be suggested for each of 
these possibilities, only the first two seem intuitively likely and 
reasonable. First is the hypothesis that inconsistent and consistent 
paths are operated on by the relevance process identically. Second is 
the hypothesis that inconsistency weakens the induced bond. Therefore, 
the prime alternatives we shall consider are limited to these two, no 
effect and weakening effect, although we can look for evidence for any 
others. 
In summary, the theoretical predictions we make are: 
* 
1) If a path of task relevance exists in S , then direct task rele-
vance bonds will be established from indirectly related elements 
to the appropriate task outcomes, whether the induced bond links 
consistent or inconsistent elements. 
2a) If a path of inconsistently evaluated elements induces an incon-
sistent direct task relevance bond, then the strength of the 
induced bond will be similar to the strength of a consistent 
bond induced from a consistent path (i.e., inconsistency has no 
effect); or 
2b) If a path of inconsistently evaluated elements induces an incon-
sistent direct task relevance bond, then the strength of the 
induced bond will be less than the strength of a consistent bond 
induced from a consistent path (i.e., inconsistency has a weak-
ening effect). 
THE EXPERIMENT 
In order to evaluate these predictions, a two-phase experiment 
(identified to the subjects as a single experiment) was conducted. In 
the first phase, a specific status characteristic was established and 
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subjects were assigned differentiated states of this characteristic. 
The second phase made use of the standardized experimental situation 
mentioned above; this situation involves a decision-making task, which 
allows measurement of each subject's likelihood of accepting influence, 
which in turn serves as an indicator of the subject's power and pres-
tige position in the group. 
Four conditions were created. The first two were baseline con-
ditions: Condition One, in which a path of relevance was established 
between the positive state of the specific status characteristic and 
the positive state of the characteristic directly relevant to the task; 
and Condition Two, in which a path was established between the negative 
state of the specific status characteristic and the negative state of 
the characteristic directly relevant to the task. The other two condi-
tions were experimental: Condition Three, in which a path of relevance 
was established between the positive state of the specific status char-
acteristic and the negative state of the characteristic directly rele-
vant to the task; and Condition Four, in which a path of relevance was 
established between the negative state of the specific status charac-
teristic and the positive state of the characteristic directly relevant 
to the task. 
Two subjects participated in each experimental group. On arri-
val, each subject was taken separately to the experimental room to 
g 
begin the first phase of the experiment. The subjects were then told: 
Well, I see that both of you boys are the same age and at the 
same grade level in school, and are from two different paro-
chial high schools in this area. 
This information (only roughly accurate; see description of the subject 
pool below) was designed to eliminate as far as possible the activation 
- 15 -
of any status characteristics (e.g., age, educational level) in the 
situation other than those we manipulated. Since the subjects were not 
permitted to actually see one another throughout the experiment, the 
potential for activation of extraneous characteristics was minimal. 
Each subject was given a paper and pencil test, designed to 
establish a fictional ability called Meaning Insight Ability, constitut-
ing the specific status characteristic in the situation. The test was 
said to measure "meaning insight," a basic ability of the individual. 
The test consists of word association problems, which require matching 
an English word with the supposed phonetic spellings of two non-English 
words from a language unknown to the subjects. For each of the 20 test 
items, the subjects were asked to determine which of the two foreign 
language words had the same meaning as the English word. Previous 
experience with the test has demonstrated that it is believable enough 
to capture the subjects' commitment, yet ambiguous enough that the 
experimenter can induce a subject's belief and confidence in almost any 
score. Consequently, it is quite useful for assigning differentiated 
states of a specific status characteristic. 
One of the experimenters then "scored" the tests and reported the 
"scores" to the subjects publicly. In each group, the subjects were 
randomly assigned to two cases, referred to as (+-) (i.e., high self 
expectation, low other expectation) and (-+) (i.e., low self expecta-
tion, high other expectation). Subjects assigned to the (+-) case were 
told they got 18 correct answers out of a possible 20, while those 
assigned to the (-+) case were told they got 7 correct out of a possible 
20. These scores were then compared with a set of "national standards." 
The scores of the (+-) subjects were interpreted as reflecting a high 
degree of ability, and those of the (-+) subjects as reflecting a low 
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degree of ability. After reporting of scores and the completion of 
questionnaires, the subjects began the second phase of the study. 
In the second phase, which utilized the standardized experimental 
situation, the subjects were told they would be working as a team on a 
group decision-making task called "Contrast Sensitivity." The task is a 
perceptual judgment task involving stimuli projected on slides. Each 
slide consists of two rectangular patterns arranged vertically, each 
pattern composed of smaller black and white rectangles. Subjects were 
told that they had to decide for each slide whether the top or the bot-
tom pattern contained the greater area of white. The task had been 
9 
previously standardized to ensure that it would be ambiguous. 
The decision-making procedure entailed the following: -irst, on 
each slide each subject gave an initial opinion of the correct answer, 
was allowed to see the other person's initial opinion, and then made a 
private final decision. The exchange of initial opinions was presented 
to the subjects as a means of improving the team score (i.e., the sum 
of each individual's total number of "correct" answers). To facilitate 
this presentation, "individual" and "team scoring standards" for the 
Contrast Sensitivity task were given to the subjects. 
In fact, the exchange of initial opinions was controlled. The 
subjects communicated by means of the panels of an interaction control 
machine (ICOM). Each subject's panel allows him to indicate his initial 
choice by pressing one of two buttons, provides lights indicating his 
partner's initial choice, and finally allows him to indicate his final 
decision by means of a second set of buttons. One of the experimenters 
operates the ICOM from another room, so that a subject may be made to 
see an agreeing or disagreeing initial choice from his partner, regard-
less of his partner's actual initial choice. 
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At this point, the subjects were told that it was important for 
them to have as much information about each other as possible. The 
experimental manipulation (i.e., of consistent or inconsistent relevance 
bonds) was then introduced. In the consistent conditions, subjects were 
told: 
The reason you took the Meaning Insight Ability test in Phase I 
of today's study is because social scientists have learned that 
Meaning Insight is one of those abilities which is actually 
directly related to Contrast Sensitivity. That is, previous 
studies have repeatedly shown that individuals who have high 
Meaning Insight Ability usually have high Contrast Sensitivity. 
Similarly, individuals who have low Meaning Insight Ability usu-
ally have low Contrast Sensitivity. 
At this stage in our research, we are not completely certair 
why Meaning Insight and Contrast Sensitivity are directly 
related. However, we believe these two abilities are probably 
not distinct. That is, they require capacities to make dis-
criminations that involve similar and complementary thought 
processes. 
In the inconsistent conditions, subjects were told: 
The reason you took the Meaning Insight Ability test in Phase I 
of today's study is because social scientists have learned that 
Meaning Insight is one of those abilities which is actually 
inversely related to Contrast Sensitivity. That is, previous 
studies have repeatedly shown that individuals who have low 
Meaning Insight Ability usually have high Contrast Sensitivity. 
Similarly, individuals who have high Meaning Insight Ability usu-
ally have low Contrast Sensitivity. 
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...At this stage in our research, we are not completely certaii 
why Meaning Insight and Contrast Sensitivity are inversely 
related. However, we believe these two abilities are probably 
distinct. That is, they require capacities to make discrimina-
tions that involve different and competing thought processes. 
Four conditions were therefore created. First, subjects who had been 
assigned to the (+-) case in Phase I and who were told that Meaning 
Insight was directly related to Contrast Sensitivity were placed in Con-
dition One, the Consistent (+-)(+-) condition. Those assigned to the 
(-+) case in Phase I and told that Meaning Insight and Contrast Sensi-
tivity were directly related were placed in Condition Two, the Consis-
tent (-+)(-+) condition. These two conditions constituted the baseline 
conditions, and provide a means of evaluating the strength of the sprea 
of relevance along consistent paths, enabling comparisons with the rela 
tive strength of the effect along inconsistent paths. Second, subjects 
assigned to (+-) case in Phase I and told that Meaning Insight and Con-
trast Sensitivity were inversely related were placed in Condition Three 
the Inconsistent (+-)(-+) condition. Finally, those assigned the (-+) 
state in Phase I and told that Meaning Insight and Contrast Sensitivity 
were inversely related were placed in Condition Four, the Inconsistent 
(-+)(+-) condition. 
The experiment ran for 25 trials, of which 20 were "critical," 
in the sense that subjects found themselves "disagreeing" with their 
partners on their initial opinions. The remaining five trials were 
agreement trials, introduced to increase the credibility of the experi-
ment. These five trials were randomly distributed through the series, 
with one agreement occurring in each block of five trials. 
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Following the completion of the trials, subjects were asked to 
fill out a second questionnaire, and then were interviewed individually. 
The questionnaires and interviews were designed primarily to elicit 
information relevant to questions of suspicion and to success of the 
manipulations. At the conclusion of the interview, each subject was 
given a full explanation of the purposes of the study, including an 
account of all the deceptions involved. 
One hundred twenty four subjects participated in the experiment. 
All were students in local private high schools, who had volunteered to 
participate, and who were paid for their participation. The data 
obtained from 25 subjects were not included in the analysis of the 
results because of violations of one or more of the initial conditions 
of the experiment, as determined by the interview. The criteria for 
classification of subjects in expectation states experiments have been 
standardized, and are generally as follows: 
1. Suspicions Subjects are eliminated from the sample if they 
become suspicious of any of the experimental manipulations. This cate-
gory also includes subjects who had previously read about deception 
experiments and thought the present experiment was similar to them, and 
subjects who had heard from others that the study involved deception. 
2. Extraneous basis of differentiation between subjects: If any 
particular set of circumstances provided a subject with a basis of dif-
ferentiation between himself and the other apart from the experimental 
manipulations, the subject was eliminated from the sample. (For exam-
ple, subjects were eliminated if they were previously acquainted with 
one another. 
3. Failure of experimental manipulationss Subjects who were 
unable to understand the instructions, were confused about the 
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experiment, or did not understand and accept crucial parts of the 
instructions (such as the relation between leaning Insight and Contrast 
Sensitivity presented in Phase II) were also eliminated from the sample 
It should be noted that, in all cases, clear, consistent, and 
strong evidence of any of these violations of conditions was required 
before a subject could be excluded (see Cook, Cronkite and Wagner, 1974 
for a complete presentation of the criteria for classification of 
subjects). 
PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS 
The primary indicator in this experiment of an individual's powe 
and prestige position is his probability of accepting influence, given 
disagreement with another. The indicator is operationally defined as 
the proportion of "stay-responses," or P(S), a subject makes over the 
20 critical trials. A "stay-response" occurs when a subject's final 
decision agrees with his initial decision; otherwise, he has made a 
change response. 
Our primary prediction with regard to the baseline conditions is 
relatively straightforward. Since paths of task relevance connect the 
specific status characteristic, Meaning Insight, with the task, we pre-
dict that the spread of relevance process will operate, and that, as a 
consequence, Meaning Insight will serve as the basis for the formation 
of performance expectations such that these expectations will be consis 
tent with the distribution of evaluations on the specific status char-
acteristic. These performance expectations will then determine the 
power and prestige position of the subjects. Consequently, we expect 
subjects in Condition One, C(+-)(+-), to have a higher stay-response 
rate than those in Condition Two, C(-+)(-+); in other words, we pre-
dict that P ^ S ) > P2(S). 
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This prediction is quite clearly supported. First, as shown in 
the first two rows of Table 1, the proportion of stay-responses in the 
C(h—) (h—) condition is 0.730; the proportion of stay-responses in the 
C(-+)(-+) condition is 0.491. The difference is quite large. Table 2 
shows the results of the Mann-Whitney U nonparametric test applied to 
these two conditions; the results of this test indicate that the proba-
bility of obtaining these values by chance alone is considerably less 
than .001. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
There are two alternative sets of predictions with regard to the 
experimental conditions and the possible effects of inconsistency of 
paths in determining the power and prestige order in the group. The 
first alternative is that inconsistent paths induce bonds of the same 
strength as bonds induced by consistent paths (No Inconsistency Effect). 
The second alternative is that inconsistent paths induce bonds weaker 
than those induced by consistent paths (Inconsistency Effect). In the 
No Inconsistency Effect case, since paths of relevance connect Meaning 
Insight inconsistently with the task, we predict that expectations will 
be formed such that these expectations will be inconsistent with the 
distribution of evaluations on the specific status characteristic. 
Power and prestige ordering in the group is then determined by these 
formed performance expectations. More specifically, if there is no 
inconsistency effect, then a bond is induced which makes C ^ - ) relevant 
to T(+), and C1(+) relevant to T(-). That is, if the actor possesses 
C^-), he expects to be successful at the task; if he possesses C1(+), 
he does not expect to be successful. Therefore, C1(-) and C1(+) become 
information signals of high and low ability at the task, respectively. 
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As a result, the actor forms task expectations for self and other that 
are inconsistent with the initial evaluation of the states of the speci 
fic status characteristic. Consequently, we would expect subjects in 
the I(-+) (+-) condition to have a stay-response rate similar to that of 
subjects in the C(+-)(+-) condition; also, we would expect subjects in 
the I(+-)(-+) condition to have stay-response rates similar to those of 
subjects in the C(-+)(-+) condition; finally, we would expect subjects 
in the I(-+)(+-) condition to have a higher stay-response rate than 
those in the I (+-)(-+) condition. More succinctly, if inconsistency 
has no effect, we predict that P1(S) = P4(S), P2(S) = P3(S), and 
P4(S) > P3(S). 
In the Inconsistency Effect case, the spread of relevance proces 
is assumed to continue to operate; however, the resulting formation of 
expectations (and hence the determination of power and prestige order-
ing in the group) is less homogeneous. First, we assume that, if there 
is an inconsistency effect, then for some actors the bond is formed 
(i.e., between C1(-) and T(+) or between C1(+) and T(-)); for others 
no bond is formed. For those for whom the bond is formed, the formatio 
of performance expectations, the determination of power and prestige 
position, and thus the actor's P(S), are similar to that previously 
described (i.e., in the No Inconsistency Effect case). However, for 
those for whom the bond is not formed, either of two processes may 
occur: (1) since they have no information on which to base differenti-
ated expectations, actors retain undefined or neutral expectations for 
self and other; hence their relative power and prestige positions and 
P(S) values will be similar (in between a high value and a low value); 
or (2) since the specific status characteristic itself provides per-
formance information, actors form expectations consistent with the 
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original evaluations of that characteristic; hence their power and 
prestige positions and P(S) values are differentiated but in reverse 
order to those of the first group (i.e., for whom the bond is formed). 
Consequently, if there is an inconsistency effect, then subjects in the 
inconsistent conditions will be made up of at least two of the three 
types above. Whichever set of types occurs, the mean P(S) in the con-
dition where subjects possess the C1(-) state should be lowered, and 
the mean P(S) in the condition where subjects possess the C1(+) state 
should be raised. In other words, the mean stay-response rate in the 
I(-+)(+-) condition should be lower than in the C(+-)(+-) condition, 
and the mean stay-response rate in the I(+-)(-+) condition should be 
higher than in the C (-+)(-+) condition. More strictly, if inconsistenc 
has a moderate effect, we predict that P1(S) > P4(S) and P2(S) < P3(S). 
Finally, we note that, if inconsistency has a very powerful 
effect, we assume that the bond is induced for no one in an inconsis-
tent situation. If subjects then retained neutral status expectations, 
we would predict that P4(S) = P3(S); if subjects formed expectations 
consistent with the distribution of evaluations on the specific status 
characteristic, we would predict that P^(S) > P4(S). 
Tables 1 and 2 present data relevant to these predictions. 
First, we note that the P(S) in the I(-+)(+-) condition is 0.686. 
This proportion is somewhat smaller than the first alternative of No 
Consistency Effect would suggest (0.730 from tiie C(+-)(+-) condition); 
however, the one-tailed Mann-Whitney U statistic comparing these two 
conditions shows that the probability of obtaining these values by 
chance if the alternative hypothesis is that P1(S) > P4(S) is about .10, 
The results of this test indicate support for the first alternative, at 
least in the sense that it cannot be rejected. Second, we see that the 
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P(S) in the I(+-)(-+) condition is slightly less than in the C(-+)(-+) 
condition (0.467 vs. 0.491). This result clearly conflicts with the 
prediction given by the second alternative of an Inconsistency Effect. 
In addition, the one-tailed Mann-Whitney U between these two conditions 
indicates that the probability of obtaining this result by chance is 
about .22 if the alternative hypothesis is that P2(S) < Again, 
the hypothesis of No Inconsistency Effect must be preferred over its 
primary alternative. Finally, we may compare P4(S) with P^fS). We see 
that the proportion of stay-responses in the I(-+)(+-) condition is 
much greater than the proportion in the I(+-)(-+) condition. Again the 
result is compatible with the predictions of the No Inconsistency 
Effect alternative, and severely contradicts the Inconsistency Effect 
alternatives (particularly if the effect of inconsistency is to be 
quite powerful). As Table 2 shows, the probability that this result 
would occur by chance alone is considerably less than .001. 
INTERPRETATIONS AND COMMENTS 
We first conclude that, as predicted by the theory, the spread 
of relevance process does operate in both types of situations, those 
involving consistent paths of relevance and those involving inconsis-
tent paths, since both predictions concerning this process are directly 
supported (i.e., P ^ S ) > P2 (S) and P4 (S) > P3 (S)) . These results are 
also consistent with Berger, Fisek and Freese (1970)."''''" 
In addition, we conclude that inconsistency of paths does not 
affect the strength of induced bonds, since all three predictions basec 
on the first alternative (No Inconsistency Effect) are to be preferred 
over those based on the second alternative (Inconsistency Effect). 
This conclusion, however, is subject to some reservations. First, 
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while the alternative of a simple inconsistency effect is clearly 
rejected, the alternative of no effect is not unambiguously supported. 
It is, for example, possible that inconsistency decreases the strength 
or probability of induction of bonds linking elements along a path com-
posed primarily of positive elements, while inconsistency increases the 
strength or probability of induction of bonds linking elements along a 
path composed primarily of negative elements (i.e., a high status per-
son is less likely to introduce conflicting status information into the 
situation than is a low status person; a high status person could only 
lower his status by including more negative status elements, while a loT 
status person could only raise his status by including more positive 
status elements). Such an alternative, while theoretically more com-
plex, is consistent with the data (although it cannot be preferred sim-
ply on the basis of the results achieved thus far). Nevertheless, sucl. 
an alternative cannot be ruled out, inasmuch as no single study can 
provide sufficient evidence to totally exclude these alternatives. A 
related limitation on our conclusions is based on a statistical arti-
fact. Predictions of equality can be evaluated only as null hypothe-
ses, not as alternative hypotheses in the statistical sense; as a con-
sequence, evaluation of such predictions is more difficult. While null 
hypotheses can be "rejected," they cannot be "supported," only "not 
rejected." Hence, the only way to develop firm confidence in such a 
prediction is to "not reject" it many times. Obviously, then, firm cor 
fidence in the hypothesis of No Inconsistency Effect cannot be achieve-
on the basis of the results of this study alone. Rather, we can only 
say that it is to be preferred against the alternatives presented on 
the basis of the data gathered thus far. 
One direction for further research, then, would be to attempt tc 
replicate this finding in a number of separate studies. It would also 
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be useful to test for an inconsistency effect in situations involving 
longer paths of task relevance, particularly when the distribution of 
positively and negatively evah'atod elements is less "balanced." For 
examni^. ^y be the case that the longer the path of relevance 
across which a bond is induced, the greater the effect of the inconsis-
tency of the path on the strength of the induced bond. In such a case, 
it would then be important to determine whether paths composed of equal 
numbers of positive and negative elements influence the effect of incon-
sistency more, less, or about the same as paths composed of grossly 
unequal numbers of positive and negative elements. 
SUMMARY 
Over the past ten years, a body of theory and related empirical 
research has begun to emerge that provides detailed information about 
the operation of status organizing processes in social interaction. In 
general, this work specifies the constituents of status situations, 
posits the processes by which these elements organize and define situa-
tions, and predicts behavior patterns on the basis of these definitions 
of status situations. 
This study has been concerned primarily with one of the processes 
by which status elements become organized so as to define the situation: 
the spread of relevance process. Specifically, the study evaluates 
whether, given a path of task relevance linking a specific status char-
acteristic with a task outcome, the inconsistency of the path affects 
the strength of the direct task relevance bond induced by that path. 
Using a standardized experimental procedure, we tested (1) the predic-
tion that spread of relevance would occur in both inconsistent and con-
sistent situations, and (2) alternative predictions that inconsistent 
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paths would induce bonds equal in strength to bonds induced by 
consistent paths. The results of the study indicate that the spread of 
relevance process does operate in both inconsistent and consistent sit-
uations, and provides support for the argument that the inconsistency of 
paths of task relevance has no effect on the strength of direct task 
relevance bonds induced by them. 
This result's importance is that it allows us to extend the 
spread of relevance process (and its constituent notions, particularly 
the idea of a path of task relevance) to more complex status organizing 
situations. It suggests that, regardless of the evaluative composition 
of the set of status elements to be organized, the spread of relevance 
process operates so as to complete the status definition or organiza-
tion as much as possible by inducing equally strong bonds of direct 
task relevance with status elements i«rtiich were previously only 
indirectly related to the task. 
Further research should be conducted, both to increase confi-
dence in the results of this study and to extend the applicability of 
the spread of relevance process still further, particularly to cover 
longer, less balanced paths of relevance. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Simmel (1908; in Wolff, 1950; 307) suggested that "the first 
condition of having to deal with somebody at all is to know with 
whom one has to deal" (italics in original). However, we cannot kno1 
somebody completely as an individual. Rather, "we conceive of each 
man—and this is a fact which has a specific effect upon our practi-
cal behavior toward him—as being the human type which is suggested 
by his individuality. We think of him in terms not only of his sin-
gularity but also in terms of a general category" (Simmel, 1908; 
in Wolff, 1959s 343). Park (1928) presented a conception of inter-
action in which an individual, on encountering another individual,, 
(1) classifies him in terms of general status categories, (2) attri-
butes to him characteristics associated with his categories, and 
(3) organizes his conduct toward him on the basis of such stereo-
typical assumptions. 
2 This work, stemming originally from the research of Bales and his 
associates, is summarized in Berger, Conner and Fisek (1974s 5-9). 
3 A status characteristic is diffuse if it involves more than one set 
of expectation states specific to clearly defined situations, and, 
in addition, at least one set of general expectation states, appli-
cable to a broad range of situations. Race and sex, for example, 
are typically diffuse status characteristics. 
4 A status characteristic is specific if it involves a single set of 
expectation states specific to a clearly defined situation. For 
example, in many situations, mathematical ability may be regarded 
as a specific status characteristic. 
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5 The observable power and prestige order (OPPO) of a group encompasses 
the distribution of each of four related components of interaction? 
(1) opportunities to perform, called action opportunities, (2) prob-
lem solving attempts, (3) communicated evaluations of performances, 
and (4) attempted influence of one group member by another. Some 
aspect of the OPPO (or a behavior derivable from it) serves as a 
dependent variable in all of the studies cited in this paper. 
6 It is important to remember that nothing in the theory assumes any 
natural superiority of the group member with an expectation advan-
tage. The theory is concerned rather with the status organizing 
process, given that group members possess states of salient charac-
teristics, whatever the sources or legitimacy of the evaluations of 
those states. For example, the theory would account equally as well 
for the expectation advantage and greater influence of a woman over 
a man in a situation where "female" is more highly evaluated than 
"male," as it would for the more culturally prevalent situation. 
7 Note that, if a path of relevance is inconsistent, then the induced 
bond may be consistent or inconsistent. We are concerned with the 
latter case. We believe that, if the spread of relevance operates 
along inconsistent paths when the bond to be induced is inconsistent, 
it probably also operates along inconsistent paths when the induced 
bond is consistent. We are not prepared to argue that the opposite 
is true as well. We therefore are concerned with the inconsistent 
path case that represents a more severe test of the operation of the 
spread of relevance process. 
8 In groups where only one subject had been scheduled or the second 
subject did not show up, a confederate was used. As should be seen 
from the description of the experiment, the use of a confederate 
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should have no effect on the.realjsubject's behavior in the 
situation, since he had no way of describing him other than in 
terms with which we provided him (i.e., in terms of salient speci-
fic status characteristics). 
9 The actual probability of choosing either alternative is approxi-
mately 0.5 for each slide (Ofshe, 1967). 
10 Despite careful screening and elaborate precautions, these types of 
problems cannot be completely eliminated. For example, in one case 
in this experiment, two subjects who went to different schools knew 
each other from their athletic endeavors and arrived together at 
the laboratory. Under such circumstances, it is nearly impossible 
to eliminate the extraneous bases of differentiation such prior 
familiarity may induce. 
11 We should note also another result consistent with past evidence. 
The last column of Table 1 reveals that the variance of the number 
of stay-responses is considerably higher for the cases where the 
direct relevance bond is (-+) than it is for the corresponding (+-) 
cases. This effect has also been observed by Camilleri and Berger 
(1967), Berger and Fisek (1970), and Berger, Fisek and Freese 
(1970). While we have no rigorous explanation for this phenomenon, 
we believe the high variances obtained in these cases probably 
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FIGURE ONE 
GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF THE OPERATION 
OF THE SPREAD OF RELEVANCE PROCESS Hi THE CONSISTENT SITUATION 
a. befora the spread of relevance 
p' C1(+) C*(+K 
b. after the spread of relevance 
— C* (+X p' c1(+) 
T(+) T(+) 
T(-) 
c1(-) C*(-) cx(-) — •C* (-) 
P1 possesses C,(+) which is relevant to C*(+) which is relevant to T(+). 
5) possesses C, (-) which is relevant to C*(-) which is relevant to T(-) „ 
Each path is composed of similarly (i.e. consistently) evaluated elements 
(C , C*, T). 
The dotted liae indicates the direct task relevance bond induced by the 
spread of relevance. 
FIGURE TWO 
GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF THE OPERATION 
OF THE SPREAD OF RELEVANCE PROCESS IN THE INCONSISTENT SITUATION 
a. before t-ie spread of relevance 
P'-
o -
b. after the spread of relevance 
p» CT (+) c* (+) 
P' possesses C, (+) which is relevant to C*(-) which is relevant to T(-). 
0 possesses C,(-) which is relevant to C*(+) which is relevant to T(+). 
Each patil is composed of dissimilarly (i.e. inconsistently) evaluated elements 
(C,, C*, T). 
The dotted line indicates the direct task relevance bond induced by the 
spread of relevance. 
TABLE ONE 
PROPORTION, MEM AND VARIANCE OF NIIEER OF STAY RESPONSES PER SUBJECT 
Condition 
1. C (H—) (+-) 
2. C(-+) (-+) 

























RESULTS OF HANN-VMITWEY U TESTS (QiE-TAILED) 
APPLIED IX) DIFFEI^CES BETWEEN CONDITIONS 
Test Statistics 
Case Tested U Z prob-value 
C(+-) (+-) vs. C(-+) (-+) 55 4.827 « .001 
C(+-)(+-) vs. I(-+)(+-) 279 1.278 .1006 
C(-+)(-+) vs. I(+-)(-+) 230 0.763 .2227 
!(-+)(+-) vs. !(+-)(-+) 91 4.395 « .001 
